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Abstract
Microeconomic lumpiness matters for macroeconomics. According to our DSGE model, it ex-
plains roughly 60% of the smoothing in the investment response to aggregate shocks. The remaining
40% is explained by general equilibrium forces. The central role played by micro frictions for ag-
gregate dynamics results in important nonlinearities and history dependance in business cycles. In
particular, booms feed into themselves. The longer an expansion, the larger the response of invest-
ment to an additional positive shock. Conversely, a slowdown after a boom can lead to a long lasting
investment slump, which is unresponsive to policy stimuli. Such dynamics are consistent with US
investment patterns over the last decade. Furthermore, the reduction in the relative importance of
general equilibrium forces for aggregate investment dynamics also facilitates matching conventional
RBC moments for consumption and employment.
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Casualobservationsuggeststhatnon-convexitiesinmicroeconomiccapitaladjustmentsisawidespread
pattern. Doms and Dunne (1998) corroborate this perception by documenting the lumpy nature of
equipment investment in US manufacturing establishments. The question then arises whether or not
these microeconomic frictions matter for macroeconomic behavior. In this paper we incorporate lumpy
adjustment in an otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and con-
clude that they do.
The main impact of microeconomic lumpiness is to generate impulse responses for aggregate in-
vestment which are not only more persistent than in the standard RBC model, but also nonlinear and
history dependent. In particular, the longer an expansion, the larger the response of investment to fur-
ther shocks. Booms feed upon themselves. Conversely, a slowdown after a boom can lead to a long
lasting investment slump, which is unresponsive to policy stimuli. Such dynamics are consistent with
US investment patterns over the last decade.
Underlyingourﬁndingsisanissuethatisofcentralimportanceformicro-foundedmacroeconomics,
beyond our particular model. Namely the answer to the question: How much of aggregate smoothing—
and impulse responses in general—is accounted for by microeconomic features and how much by gen-
eral equilibrium forces? The basic RBC model attributes all of the smoothing to the latter. In contrast,
our model calibration indicates that microeconomic non-convexities account for an important part of
the smoothing in the response of investment to aggregate shocks.
Table 1: FROM AGGREGATE SHOCKS TO AGGREGATE RESPONSE: SOURCES OF SMOOTHING
Aggregate shocks
↓
partial equilibrium smoothing: micro frictions and aggregation
↓
general equilibrium smoothing: supply of labor and funds
↓
Aggregate response
This decomposition is the key to our calibration strategy and explains our starkly different results
from recent attempts to embody lumpy adjustment models in a DSGE framework (e.g. Veracierto (2002),
Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2005)). Table 1 illustrates this decomposition. The objec-
tive in any macroeconomic model is to trace the impact of aggregate shocks on aggregate endogenous
1variables (investment, in our context). The typical response is not one-for-one at impact, as a variety of
microeconomicfrictionsandgeneralequilibriumconstraints,smoothandspreadovertimetheresponse
of the endogenous variable. We refer to this process as smoothing, and decompose it into partial equi-
librium (PE) and general equilibrium (GE) smoothing. In the context of nonlinear lumpy-adjustment
models, PE-smoothing includes not only microeconomic frictions but also the effect of aggregation on
the mapping from these frictions to aggregate responses. This is key in our class of models, as in many
instances aggregation can undo much of the effect of microeconomic frictions (recall the classic Caplin
and Spulber (1987) result where price-setters follow (S,s) rules but the aggregate price level behaves as
if there were no microeconomic frictions). In a nutshell, our key difference with the previous literature
is that through a combination of small adjustment costs and strong offsetting forces from aggregation,
previous models left almost no role for PE-smoothing. We argue below that such a conclusion is coun-
terfactual.
Table 2 illustrates our model’s decomposition between PE- and GE-smoothing: The upper entry
shows the volatility of aggregate investment rates in our model when neither smoothing mechanism is
present(inotherwords,whentherearenoadjustmentcostsatthemicroeconomiclevelandnopricead-
justments in the economy). The intermediate entries incorporate PE and GE-smoothing, one at a time,
while the lower entry considers both sources of smoothing simultaneously. Of course, both sources of
smoothing are not orthogonal, so some care is needed when quantifying their contributions to overall
smoothing.




Only PE smoothing ↓ Only GE smoothing
(0.0093) (0.0134)
& .
PE and GE smoothing
(0.0074)
Table 2 shows that the reduction of the standard deviation of the aggregate investment rate achieved
byPE-smoothingaloneamountsto88.7%ofthereductionachievedbythecombinationofbothsmooth-
ing mechanisms. Alternatively, the additional smoothing achieved by PE-forces, compared with what
GE-smoothing achieves by itself, is 38% of the smoothing achieved by both sources. The 60% mentioned
in the abstract—slightly above the average of 63.3% of the above upper and lower bounds—conveniently
2summarizes the contribution of PE factors to aggregate smoothing.1
Given its centrality in differentiating our answer from that of previous models, our calibration strat-
egy is designed to capture the role of PE-smoothing as directly as possible. To this effect, we use sectoral
data to calibrate all the micro-frictions and aggregation parameters, before general equilibrium forces
have a chance to play a smoothing role. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the response of semi-aggregated (e.g.,
3-digit) investment to corresponding sectoral shocks is less subject to general equilibrium forces, and
hence serves to identify the relative importance of PE-smoothing. Once this step is taken, we can use
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution as a reduced form parameter to calibrate the extra smoothing
given by general equilibrium forces.2
Table 3: VOLATILITY AND AGGREGATION
Model 3-digit Aggregate 3-dig. Agg. Ratio
Data 0.0186 0.0074 2.51
Frictionless: 0.3642 0.0074 49.22
This paper: 0.0186 0.0074 2.51
Khan-Thomas-Lumpy (2005): 0.2524 0.0074 34.11
The ﬁrst row in Table 3 shows the observed volatility of sectoral and aggregate investment rates, and
their ratio. The second row shows the same values for a model with no microeconomic frictions in in-
vestment (essentially, the standard RBC model), and the third row does the same for our model. We
reserve for later the fourth row, which reports the same statistics for the model in Khan and Thomas
(2005). It is apparent from this table that the frictionless RBC model fails to match the disaggregated
data (it was never designed to do so). In contrast, by reallocating smoothing from GE forces to PE-forces,
the lumpy investment model is able to match both aggregate and sectoral volatility. This pins down our
decomposition.
Aside from our main results characterizing the aggregate impact of microeconomic lumpiness, there
is an indirect beneﬁt of adding microeconomic lumpiness to the standard model, as it facilitates match-
ing conventional RBC moments for consumption and employment. The reason is that in the standard
RBC model, where all the smoothing of the response of quantities to aggregate shocks is done by general
equilibrium forces, the volatility of investment relative to that of consumption and employment is too
1The exact expressions for the upper and lower bounds for the contribution of PE-smoothing are the following:
UB = log[σ(NONE)/σ(PE)]/log[σ(NONE)/σ(BOTH)],
LB = 1−log[σ(NONE)/σ(GE)]/log[σ(NONE)/σ(BOTH)]
where NONE refers to the partial equilibrium the model with no microeconomic frictions, PE to the model that only has mi-
croeconomic frictions but prices are ﬁxed, GE to the model with only GE constraints, and BOTH to the model with both micro
frictions and GE constraints. See Appendix E for more details.
2An alternative strategy would be to use plant level data to sort out the different parameter conﬁgurations. While much has
beenlearnedfromsuchexplorationsinothercontexts,thisisnotarobuststrategyinthecaseoflumpyadjustmentmodelssince
the mapping from microeconomic frictions to aggregate data, even before general equilibrium enters, is complex and often not
robust. It depends on subtle parameters such as the drift of the (micro) driving forces and, more generally, parameters that
affect the cross-section distribution of agents’ state variables.
3high relative to US data (see, e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). Thus models that ﬁt the second moments of
investment well (such as the standard RBC model), imply consumption and employment that are too
smooth. In contrast, in our model lumpy microeconomic frictions smooth investment and hence the
strength of general equilibrium forces needed to match investment volatility can be reduced. This re-
sults in consumption and employment becoming more volatile, ﬁtting US data.
In our model we control the strength of the general equilibrium forces with the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, which we interpret as a reduced form parameter to capture unmodelled sources of
ﬂat quasi-labor supply and capital supply to the primary sector of the economy. We ﬁnd that the param-
eter of EIS that matches the data best exceeds 10. Whether one interprets this as a “puzzle” or as a hint
that the EIS parameter in these models is not what its microeconomic counterpart purports it to be, as
wedo,isamatteroftaste. However,itisimportanttostressthatourmainﬁndingsregardingthepatterns
of aggregate investment survive reducing the EIS parameter to its conventional value of one. Moreover,
if one is willing to raise it to Gruber’s (2005) recent ﬁnding of 2, then our model also improves broader
moments-matching by over 40 percent.
Relation to the literature
Our main ﬁndings are qualitatively similar to those discussed in the partial equilibrium literature
on lumpy investment (see, in particular, Caballero and Engel (1999), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger
(1995) and Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999)). However, as mentioned above, they are in stark
contrast with ﬁndings in the ﬁrst wave of DSGE models, such as Veracierto (2002), Thomas (2002), and
Khan and Thomas (2003, 2005), who encountered a sort of “irrelevance” result:3 Essentially, they found
that embedding a model with microeconomic irreversibility and/or lumpiness in an otherwise standard
RBCmodel,makesnodifferenceformacroeconomics(relativetotheimplicationsofthefrictionlessRBC
model). The reason for our difference can be seen in the last row of Table 3, which shows that the Khan
and Thomas model has a decomposition of smoothing between PE and GE forces similar to that of the
frictionless RBC model. That is, their frictions, once ﬁltered by the aggregation process, have almost no
effect at the aggregate level even in partial equilibrium.
More precisely, Table 4 is analogous to Table 2 but for the Khan-Thomas model.4 It can be seen that
micro frictions imply no additional smoothing after GE forces have set in—they only account for some-
where between 0 and 18% of total smoothing. Thus we view their work as an important methodological
contribution on which we build our analysis, but not as an adequate assessment of the equilibrium im-
plications of lumpy microeconomic investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our dynamic
generalequilibriummodel. Section3discussesthecalibrationmethodindetail. Sections4and5present
3Morerecently,Sim(2006)undoesVeracierto’sversionoftheirrelevanceresultbyrelaxingthecertainty-equivalenceassump-
tion, while Bayer (2006) ﬁnds that adjustment costs matter for aggregate investment dynamics in a two-country extension of
the Khan and Thomas model.
4The difference between the value reported in the last row of this table and the corresponding value in Table 2 reﬂects
differences in calibration strategies. These differences are irrelevant for the substantive implications.




Only PE smoothing ↓ Only GE smoothing
(0.0660) (0.0080)
& .
PE and GE smoothing
(0.0080)
the main macroeconomic implications of the model. Section 6 concludes and is followed by several
appendices.
2 The Model
In this section we describe our model economy. We start with the problem of the production units, fol-
lowed by a brief description of the households and the deﬁnition of equilibrium. We conclude with a
sketch of the equilibrium computation. We follow closely Kahn and Thomas (2005) both in terms of sub-
stance and notation. Aside from parametric differences, we have three main departures from Kahn and
Thomas (2005). First, production units face persistent sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks, in addition
to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Second, production units undertake some within-period mainte-
nance investment which is necessary to continue operation (there is ﬁxed proportions and some parts
and machines that break down need to be replaced, see McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) for evidence on
the importance of maintenance investment). Third, the distribution of aggregate productivity shocks is
continuous rather than a Markov discretization.5
2.1 Production Units
The economy consists of a large number of sectors, which are each populated by a continuum of pro-
duction units. Since we do not model entry and exit decisions, the mass of these continua is ﬁxed and
normalized to one. There is one commodity in the economy that can be consumed or invested. Each
production unit produces this commodity, employing its pre-determined capital stock (k) and labor (n),
5This allows us to compute conditional nonlinear impulse response functions, as in Section 4, which are essentially deriva-
tives of an aggregate of interest, such as the investment rate, to the innovation of the aggregate productivity shock.




where zt, ²S and ²I denote aggregate, sectoral and unit-speciﬁc (idiosyncratic) productivity shocks. The
assumption of decreasing returns captures in reduced form any market power the production unit may
have.
We denote the trend growth rate of aggregate productivity by (1−θ)(γ−1), so that y and k grow at
rate γ−1 along the balanced growth path. From now on we work with k and y (and laterC) in efﬁciency
units. The detrended aggregate productivity level, which we also denote by z, evolves according to an
AR(1) process, with normal innovations v with zero mean and variance σ2
A:
logzt =ρAlogzt−1+vt. (2)
The sectoral and idiosyncratic technology processes follow Markov chains, that are approximations
to continuous AR(1) processes with Gaussian innovations. The latter have standard deviations σS and
σI,andautocorrelationsρS andρI,respectively.6 Productivityinnovationsatdifferentaggregationlevels
are independent. Also, sectoral productivity shocks are independent across sectors and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks are independent across productive units.
In each period, each production unit draws from a time-invariant distribution, G, its current cost
of capital adjustment, ξ ≥ 0, which is denominated in units of labor. G is a uniform distribution on
[0, ¯ ξ], common to all units. Draws are independent across units and over time, and employment is freely
adjustable.
At the beginning of each period, a production unit is characterized by its pre-determined capital
stock, the sector it belongs to and the corresponding sectoral productivity level, its idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, and its capital adjustment cost. Given the aggregate state, it decides its employment level, n,
production occurs, maintenance is carried out, workers are paid, and investment decisions are made.
Then the period ends.
Upon investment the unit incurs a ﬁxed cost of ωξ, where ω is the current real wage rate. Capital
depreciates at a rate δ, but units may ﬁnd it necessary during the production process to replace certain
items.
Deﬁne ¯ ψ ≡
γ
1−δ > 1 as the maintenance investment rate needed to compensate depreciation and
trend growth. The degree of necessary maintenance, χ, can then be conveniently deﬁned as a fraction
of ¯ ψ. If χ=0, no maintenance investment is needed; if χ=1, all depreciation and trend growth must be
undone for a production unit to continue operation. We can now summarize the evolution of the unit’s
capital stock (in efﬁciency units) between two consecutive periods, from k to k0 after investment i takes
place, as follows:
6We use the discretization in Tauchen (1986), see Appendix C for details.
6Fixed cost paid γk0






If χ = 0, then k0 = (1−δ)k/γ and the table is identical to the one found in Kahn and Thomas (2005),
while if χ=100%, then k0 =k. In the paper, we treat χ as a primitive parameter.7
Notice that χ is obviously irrelevant for the units that actually adjust at the end of the period. This is
nottosaythattheseunitsdonothavetospendonmaintenancewithintheproductionperiod,butrather
their net capital growth, conditional on incurring the ﬁxed cost and optimal adjustment, is independent
ofthisexpenditure. Thisisessentiallyafeatureofonlyhavingﬁxedadjustmentcosts,asopposedtomore
general adjustment technologies that include a component that depends on the magnitude of capital
adjustments.
Given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, it is sufﬁcient to describe differences across produc-
tion units and their evolution by the distribution of units over (²S,²I,k). We denote this distribution
by µ. Thus, (z,µ) constitutes the current aggregate state and µ evolves according to the law of motion
µ0 =Γ(z,µ), which production units take as given.
Next we describe the dynamic programming problem of each production unit. We will take two
shortcuts (details can be found in Kahn and Thomas, 2005). First, we state the problem in terms of
utils of the representative household (rather than physical units), and denote by p = p(z,µ) the marginal
utility of consumption. This is the relative intertemporal price faced by a production unit. Second, given
the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, continuation values can be expressed without explicitly taking
into account future adjustment costs.
It will simplify notation to deﬁne an additional parameter, ψ∈[1, ¯ ψ]:
ψ=1+( ¯ ψ−1)χ, (3)
and write maintenance investment as:8
iM =(ψ−1)(1−δ)k. (4)
Let V 1(²S,²I,k,ξ;z,µ) denote the expected discounted value—in utils—of a unit that is in idiosyn-
cratic state (²I,k,ξ), and is in a sector with sectoral productivity ²S, given the aggregate state (z,µ). Then





7We note that this maintenance investment is quite different from what Kahn and Thomas (2005) call maintenance invest-
ment in their “extended model.” For us, maintenance refers to the replacement of parts and machines without which produc-
tion cannot continue. For them, it is an extra margin of adjustment for small projects.
8Note that if ψ=1, then iM =0, and if ψ= ¯ ψ, then iM =(γ−1+δ)k, undoing all trend devaluation of the capital stock.























where both expectation operators average over next period’s realizations of the aggregate, sectoral and
idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on this period’s values.
The ﬁrst line represents the ﬂow value of a production unit that optimally adjusts its employment
level. Thesecondlineisthecontinuationvalue, ifonlynecessarymaintenanceinvestmenthasoccurred.
The third line is the continuation value, if units incur the ﬁxed costs of adjustment and then adjust opti-
mally.
Taking as given intra- and intertemporal prices, ω(z,µ) and p(z,µ), respectively, and the law of mo-
tion Γ(z,µ), the production unit chooses optimally labor demand, whether to adjust its capital stock at
the end of the period, and the optimal capital stock, conditional on adjustment. This leads to policy
functions: N = N(²S,²I,k;z,µ) and K = K(²S,²I,k,ξ;z,µ). Since capital is pre-determined, the optimal
employment decision is independent of the current adjustment cost draw.
2.2 Households
We assume a continuum of identical households that have access to a complete set of state-contingent
claims. Hence,thereisnoheterogeneityacrosshouseholds. Moreover,theyownsharesintheproduction
units and are paid dividends. We do not need to model the household side explicitly, and concentrate
instead on the ﬁrst-order conditions to determine the equilibrium wage and the intertemporal price.






1−σC − ANh, if σC 6=0
logC − ANh, otherwise,
(7)
whereC denotes consumption, Nh the household’s supply of labor and σC is the inverse of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Households maximize the expected present discounted value of the
above felicity function. By deﬁnition we have:
p(z,µ)≡UC(C,Nh)=C(z,µ)−σC, (8)















1. Production unit optimality: Taking ω, p and Γ as given, V 1(²S,²I,k;z,µ) solves (6) and the corre-
sponding policy functions are N(²S,²I,k;z,µ) and K(²S,²I,k,ξ;z,µ).
2. Household optimality: Taking ω and p as given, the household’s consumption and labor supply
satisfy (8) and (9).




Z Z ¯ ξ
0
[γK(²S,²I,k,ξ;z,µ)−(1−δ)k]dGdµ.












where J(x)=0, if x =0 and 1, otherwise.
5. Model consistent dynamics: The evolution of the cross-section that characterizes the economy,
µ0 =Γ(z,µ), is induced by K(²S,²I,k,ξ;z,µ) and the exogenous processes for z, ²S and ²I.
Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 deﬁne an equilibrium given Γ, while step 5 speciﬁes the equilibrium condi-
tion for Γ.
2.4 Solution
As is well-known, (6) is not computable, since µ is inﬁnite dimensional. Hence, we follow Krusell and
Smith (1997, 1998) and approximate the distribution µ by its ﬁrst moment over capital, and its evolution,
Γ, by a simple log-linear rule. In the same vein, we approximate the equilibrium pricing function by a
log-linear rule:9
log ¯ k0 = ak +bk log ¯ k +ck logz, (10)
logp = ap +bp log ¯ k +cp logz, (11)
9We experimented with an interaction term between ¯ k and z, but this did not yield any improvement in the ﬁt of the equi-
librium rule.
9where ¯ k denotes aggregate capital holdings. Given (9), we do not have to specify an equilibrium rule for
the real wage. As usual with this procedure, we posit this form and verify that in equilibrium it yields a
good ﬁt to the actual law of motion (see the Appendix C for details).
To implement the computation of sectoral data, we simplify the problem further and impose two
additional assumptions: 1) ρS =ρI =ρ and 2) enough sectors, so that sectoral shocks have no aggregate
effects. Both assumptions combined allow us to reduce the state space in the production unit’s problem
further to a combined technology level ²≡²S²I. Now, log² follows an AR(1) with ﬁrst-order autocorrela-
tion ρ and Gaussian innovations N(0,σ2), with σ2 ≡ σ2
S +σ2
I. Since the sectoral technology level has no
aggregate consequences by assumption, the production unit cannot use it to extract any more informa-
tion about the future than it has already from the combined technology level. Finally, it is this combined
productivity level that is discretized into a 19-state Markov chain. The second assumption allows us to
compute the sectoral problem independently of the aggregate general equilibrium problem.10
Combining these assumptions and substituting ¯ k for µ into (6) and using (??) and (10), we get a
computable dynamic programming problem:
V 1(²,k,ξ;z, ¯ k)=max
n
£












−ξω(z, ¯ k)p(z, ¯ k)−γk0p(z, ¯ k)+βE[V 0(²0,k0;z0, ¯ k0]
¢o¤
, (12)
and policy functions N = N(²,k;z, ¯ k) and K = K(²,k,ξ;z, ¯ k). We solve this problem via value function
iteration on V 0 and Gauss-Hermitian numerical integration over log(z) (for details, see Appendix C).
Severalfeaturesfacilitatethesolutionofthemodel. First,notethat,asmentionedabove,theemploy-
mentdecisionisstatic. Inparticularitisindependentoftheinvestmentdecisionattheendoftheperiod.







Next, we examine the production unit’s investment decision. Let us denote the gross value of adjusting




−γk0p(z, ¯ k)+βE[V 0(²0,k0;z0, ¯ k0)]
¢
. (14)
From this, it is obvious that neither Va nor the optimal target capital level, conditional on adjustment,
depend on current capital holdings. This reduces the number of optimization problems in the value
function iteration considerably. Denote the latter by k∗ = k∗(²;z, ¯ k). Furthermore, let us denote the
value of inaction as Vi:
Vi(²,k;z, ¯ k)≡−(1−δ)ψkp(z, ¯ k)+βE[V 0(²0,ψ
1−δ
γ
k;z0, ¯ k0)]. (15)
10In Appendix C.3 we show that our results are robust to this simplifying assumption.
10Comparing(14)with(15)showsthatVa(²;z, ¯ k)≥Vi(²,k;z, ¯ k),11 whichmeansthatif ¯ ξ=0,i.e.inafric-
tionless economy, the necessary maintenance feature is completely irrelevant. With this notation, there
exists an adjustment cost factor that would make a production unit just indifferent between adjusting
and not adjusting:
ˆ ξ(²,k;z, ¯ k)=
Va(²;z, ¯ k)−Vi(²,k;z, ¯ k)
ω(z, ¯ k)p(z, ¯ k)
≥0. (16)
WedeﬁneξT(²,k;z, ¯ k)≡min
¡¯ ξ, ˆ ξ(²,k;z, ¯ k)
¢
. Productionunitswithξ≤ξT(²,k;z, ¯ k)willadjusttheircapital
stock. Thus,








We deﬁne mandated investment for a unit with current state (²,z, ¯ k) and current capital k as:
x(²;z, ¯ k) ≡ logγk∗(²;z, ¯ k) − logψ(1−δ)k.
That is, mandated investment is the investment rate the unit would undertake, after maintaining its
capital, if its current adjustment cost draw were equal to zero. This concludes the computation of the
production unit’s decision rules and value function, given the equilibrium pricing and movement rules
(??) and (10).
The second step of the computational procedure takes the value function V 0(²,k;z, ¯ k) as given, and
pre-speciﬁes a randomly drawn sequence of aggregate technology levels: {zt}. We start from an arbitrary
distribution µ0, implying a value ¯ k0. We then re-compute (12) at every point along the sequence {zt},
and the implied sequence of aggregate capital levels {¯ kt}, without imposing the equilibrium pricing rule
(10):


















−ξA−γk0p +βE²0|²,z0|zt[V 0(²0,k0;z0, ¯ k0(kt))]
¢o
. (18)
This yields new “policy functions”
˜ N = ˜ N(²,k;zt, ¯ kt,p)
˜ K = ˜ K(²,k,ξ;zt, ¯ kt,p).
We then search for a p such that, given these new decision rules and after aggregation, the goods market
clears (labor market clearing is trivially satisﬁed). We then use this p to ﬁnd the new aggregate capital
level.
This procedure generates a time series of {pt} and {¯ kt} endogenously, with which assumed rules (??)
11The production unit can always choose k∗ =ψ1−δ
γ k.
11and (10)canbeupdatedviaasimpleOLSregression. Theprocedurestopswhentheupdatedcoefﬁcients
ak, bk, ck and ap, bp, cp are sufﬁciently close to the previous ones. We operationalize this by using an
F-test for equality of coefﬁcients. We show in Appendix C that the implied R2 of these regressions are
high for all model speciﬁcations, generally well above 0.99, indicating that production units do not make
large mistakes by using the rules (??) and (10), and that higher moments of µ are unlikely to matter for
equilibrium outcomes.
3 Calibration
For most parameters of the model (β, δ, γ, ν, ρA and ρI) we use the fairly standard values in Kahn and
Thomas (2005)—these values can be found in Appendix A. We depart from Kahn and Thomas (2005)
with respect to θ, σA, σI, as well as σC and ¯ ξ. The ﬁrstthree are relatively minor departures,12 the second
group is more central to our new calibration procedure. Finally, we determine σS by a standard Solow
residual calculation, while ρS is set equal to ρI for computational feasibility (see Appendices A and B for
details).
Typically, adjustment cost parameters are calibrated to match establishment level moments. Khan
and Thomas (2005), for example, choose ¯ ξ to match the fraction of LRD plant-level observations with an
investment rate above 20%.
Therearetwoproblemswithusingplantlevelstatisticstopindowncertainparameterssuchasthose
thatdetermineadjustmentcosts. First,thisisusuallydoneassumingthatthebasicunitinthemodelcor-
responds to the units from which the micro investment statistics are calculated (e.g., establishments in
the LRD). There is no reason why this correspondence should be correct. Indeed, the stark nature of
capital adjustments at the unit level in DSGE models with lumpy investment possibly ﬁts better what
is observed within subunits of an establishment, rather than at the establishment level.13 Second, and
more importantly, in nonlinear models such as the lumpy adjustment model, aggregation itself (before
general equilibrium) can yield too much power to apparently small changes in microeconomic param-
eters. For example, anything that changes the drift of mandated investment gaps (such as maintenance
investment), changes the mapping from microeconomic adjustment costs to aggregate dynamics (re-
call Caplin and Spulber’s (1987) extreme example where adjustment costs cannot be inferred from the
behavior of aggregates).
InAppendixDwepresentasimpleextensionofthepaper’smainmodel,illustratingthattherearetoo
many degrees of freedom for us to use micro-level statistics to pin down the model’s parameters. This
example shows how, by adding two micro parameters with no macroeconomic consequences, one can
obtain a very good ﬁt of observed micro moments. That is, the problems of matching micro moments
and matching more aggregate moments are orthogonal in this extension.
12Our production function has more curvature than the one considered in Khan and Thomas, yet note that Gourio and
Kashyap (2005) consider a much larger curvature than we do and are unable to completely break the irrelevance result. The
reason, we conjecture, is that by not having idiosyncratic shocks and maintenance investment, their cross-section distribution
remains too close to a self-replicating distribution a la Caplin and Spulber (1987). More on this below.
13Abel and Eberly (2002) and Bloom (2005) match a large number—250 or a continuum— of model-micro-units to one ob-
served productive unit (ﬁrm or establishment).
12Given these concerns, we follow an alternative approach where we replace plant-level data by sec-
toral data.14 More precisely, given a value of χ, we choose ¯ ξ and σC to match the volatility of sectoral and
aggregate US investment rates, respectively. In this approach we assume that the sectors we consider
are sufﬁciently disaggregated so that general equilibrium effects can be ignored while, at the same time,
there are enough micro units to justify the computational simpliﬁcations that can be made with a large
number of units.
Givenasetofparameters,thesequenceofsectoralinvestmentratesisgeneratedasfollows: theunits’
optimal policies are determined as described in Section 2, working in general equilibrium. Next, starting
at the steady state, the economy is subjected to a sequence of sectoral shocks. Since sectoral shocks are
assumed to have no aggregate effects and ρI =ρS, productive units perceive these shocks as part of their
idiosyncratic shock and use their optimal policies with a value of the aggregate shock equal to one and
the value of the idiosyncratic shock equal to the product of the sectoral and “truly” idiosyncratic shock,
i.e. log(²)=log(²S)+log(²I).15
The remaining parameter values are chosen as follows: θ, the output elasticity of capital, is reduced
to 0.18, in order to capture a revenue elasticity of capital, θ
1−ν, equal to 0.5, while keeping the labor share
at its 0.64-value. In reduced form, this allows us to capture the main consequence of imperfect compe-
tition for investment decisions. The sectoral TFP calculation results in σS =0.0586. We ﬁx the combined
(idiosyncratic and sectoral) standard deviation, σ, at 0.1, leaving us with a residual σI of 0.0812.
The value of sectoral volatility of investment rates we match is 0.0186. As noted in the introduction,
this number is one order of magnitude smaller than the one predicted by the frictionless RBC model (or
the Khan-Thomas model).16 This stark difference is immune to working with 4-digit sectors, in which
case the average volatility grows only slightly to 0.0254. Yet the assumption of a large enough number of
units in every sector is less tenable in the 4-digit case, which is why we work with sectors at the 3-digit
level.
Finally, to avoid biasing our comparison against the frictionless model, we recalibrate the standard
deviation of aggregate shocks so that this model—the one with higher curvature and σC = 1—matches
the volatility of the aggregate investment rate. The corresponding value for σA turns out to be 0.0095. In
whatfollows,werefertothisasthe“frictionlessmodel”todifferentiateitfromthe“standardRBCmodel”.
14Needless to say, an even better approach is to combine data at both levels of aggregation. Moreover, the time variation in
micro moments contain plenty of useful information for aggregate dynamics. Our general methodological point, however, is to
emphasize giving relatively more weight to fairly aggregated data when interested in understanding aggregate phenomena.
15The standard deviation of the truly unit speciﬁc component of the perceived idiosyncratic shock is set so that the stan-
dard deviation of the idiosyncratic component that enters the unit’s policy function remains constant and equal to the value
used when calculating the policies under GE considerations. Details about the sectoral computation can be found in Ap-
pendix C.3. There we also document a robustness exercise where, instead of assuming that sectoral shocks have no general
equilibrium effects, we recompute the optimal policies when micro units consider the distribution of sectoral productivity
shocks—summarized by its mean—as an additional state variable. The results we obtain conﬁrm the validity of our assump-
tion.
16This statement is robust to decreasing the output elasticity of capital as we do in our model: the sectoral standard deviation
of investment rates remains well above 0.20 in a frictionless model with the curvature value in Khan and Thomas.
13Results
Table 5 presents the parameters we obtain for alternative values of the maintenance parameter χ.17
Theﬁrstcolumninthistabledepictsthelargestadjustmentcostunitscouldpay.18 Ofcourse,theaverage
cost actually paid is much lower, as shown in the second column. Productive units wait for good draws
to adjust, and the adjustment cost they pay on average when adjusting is between 6 and 7% of the mean
value of the distribution of adjustment costs. Since the average wage in the models is close to one and
N = 0.33 on average, three times the second column is approximately equal to the average cost paid
when adjusting, as a fraction of the wage bill.
Table 5: CALIBRATED PARAMETERS
Model Largest adj. cost, ¯ ξ Avge. ξ when adj. EIS
Frictionless: 0.000 0.0000 1.00
No maintenance: 1.551 0.0478 6.94
25% maintenance: 0.680 0.0225 7.69
50% maintenance: 0.239 0.0083 9.09
100% maintenance: 0.046 0.0014 32.25
The last column in Table 5 shows the estimated value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS). It is not surprising that since microeconomic adjustment costs substitute for general equilibrium
as a smoothing mechanism, the calibrated EIS are higher in our models. What is noteworthy, nonethe-
less, is how much higher these are relative to the standard unitary elasticity used in the standard RBC
model. Of course, neither in the latter model nor in ours is this parameter likely to represent what it is
interpreted to be doing. Rather it is an efﬁcient reduced-form parameter to capture the elasticity of the
supply of funds and of the quasi-labor supply. Interpreted in this manner, our calibration suggests that
these elasticities are substantially higher at business cycle frequency than conventionally assumed. We
return to this issue later in the paper.
Finally, it is useful to highlight at this stage the central role of maintenance investment. Note that as
it increases, adjustment costs can be lowered and the EIS raised, and still match sectoral and aggregate
investmentrates. Inotherwords,itsubstitutesforboth,PE-andGE-smoothingmechanisms. Thereason
for this role is complex, as it follows from the effect maintenance investment has on the drift of the
mandatedinvestmentprocess. Asthisdriftisreduced–whichhappensasmaintenanceinvestmentrises
– the cross-section distribution of mandated investment becomes less bunched near regions where the
probability of adjustment is high, and hence the economy’s response to shocks becomes more muted.
We return to this issue in the next section, when discussing the aggregate nonlinearities that arise in
these models.
17In order to avoid computational problems associated with a very extended distribution, when computing the model for
χ=1 we actually work with χ=0.98.
18We also choose the parameter A that captures the relative importance of leisure in the household’s utility by matching the
fraction of time worked to 1/3. The resulting value varies between 2.20 (frictionless case) and 0.968 (χ=1).
144 Aggregate Investment Dynamics
Our model calibration indicates that microeconomic non-convexities account for an important part of
the smoothing in the response of investment to aggregate shocks. In this section we characterize in
more detail the rich aggregate features, beyond smoothing, that emerge from lumpy microeconomic
adjustment. Infact,manyoftheinvestmentfeatureshighlightedinthepartialequilibriumliteraturealso
appear in our DSGE setting. In particular, here we show that, as in Caballero and Engel (1999), lumpy
adjustment models have the potential to generate aggregate impulse responses that are nonlinear and
history dependent.
Let us illustrate these features with the help of a particular sample path that is roughly designed to
mimic the boom-bust investment episode in the US during the last decade. For this, we simulate the
paths of the frictionless and lumpy (with χ=0.5) economies that result from a sequence of ﬁve consecu-
tive two-standard deviations positive aggregate productivity shocks, followed by a long period where the
innovations are equal to zero. Both economies start from their respective steady states.
Figure 1: Investment boom-bust episode












Figure 1 shows the evolution of the aggregate investment rates (as log-deviations from their steady
state values) for these two economies. There are important difference between them: While at the outset
of the boom phase their response is similar, eventually the investment rate in the lumpy economy reacts
by more than the frictionless economy to further positive shocks. The ﬂip side of the lumpy economy’s
larger boom is a more protracted decline in investment during the bust phase. Let us discuss these two
phases in turn.
Figure2plotstheevolutionoftheresponsivenessindexdeﬁnedinCaballeroandEngel(1993b), both
for the lumpy model and for the frictionless model. This index captures the response of the aggregate
investment rate to an increase in the current aggregate shock. At each point in time, this index is calcu-
lated conditional on the history of shocks, summarized by the current distribution of capital across units
15Figure 2: Responsiveness Index











(see Appendix F for the formal deﬁnition).19
Noteﬁrstthattheindexﬂuctuatesmuchlessinthefrictionlesseconomythaninthelumpyeconomy.
Recall also that the frictionless economy only has general equilibrium forces to move this index around.
Moreover, since the general equilibrium forces are much stronger in the frictionless model than in the
lumpy economy, we can safely conclude that the contribution of the general equilibrium forces to the
volatility of the index in the lumpy economy is minor.
It then follows from this ﬁgure that it is the decline in the strength of the PE-smoothing mechanism
that is responsible for the rise in the index during the boom phase. As a result, eventually the index of
responsiveness in the lumpy economy vastly exceeds that of the frictionless economy, which explains
the larger investment boom observed in the lumpy economy after a history of positive shocks.20
The reason why PE-smoothing falls as the boom progresses, and hence the index of responsiveness
rises, can be understood in relation to the Caplin and Spulber (1987) result. In that economy there is no
aggregate price (the equivalent of our investment) smoothing regardless of the extent of micro frictions.
That is, there is no partial equilibrium smoothing mechanism, despite the presence of micro frictions
(lumpy price adjustment, in their case). This disconnect between micro and macro frictions is due to
the fact that while few agents adjust to the most recent aggregate shock, the price increase each adjuster
chooses is inversely proportional to the fraction of adjusters, so that the aggregate responds one-for-one
with the shock. More precisely, Caplin and Spulber assume a simple (S,s) model and, crucially, also
assume that the cross section distribution of price deviations from a common target is uniform in the
(S,s)-interval.21 In this context, an inﬁnitesimal (positive) shock ∆m implies that a fraction ∆m/(S −s)
19The index is normalized by c ≡ 1/(1−α−θ) so that in the absence of adjustment costs, equilibrium forces and aggregate
productivity shocks the index takes the value one, see Appendix F for details.
20Note that while the frictionless economy has a a higher responsiveness index at the outset, this gap is short-lived so while
the investment rate in the frictionless economy exceeds that of the lumpy economy early on, this difference is not noticeable in
the scale of the ﬁgure.
21See Caballero and Engel (1991) for conditions under which the economy converges to the uniform distribution in Caplin
16of the agents adjust by (S−s), where S is the trigger threshold and s is the target level of the (S,s) policies




and micro frictions have no aggregate implications.
In our lumpy model, the economy is not in such a limit: The product of the fraction of adjusters and
theaveragesizeoftheiradjustmentismuchlessthantheaggregateshock, andhencethereissubstantial
PE-smoothing. However, while not at the limit, the lumpy economy does move in the direction of Caplin
andSpulber’s“frictionless”limitasfurtherpositiveshocksaccumulate(andawayfromthislimitasthese
shocks cease and the investment overhang is undone).
Figure 3: Investment boom-bust episode: Cross-section and hazard





























Figure 3 illustrates the mechanism described in the previous paragraphs. It shows the cross-section
ofmandatedinvestment(andtheprobabilityofadjusting,conditionalonmandatedinvestment)atthree
points in time: the beginning of the episode with the economy at its steady state (solid line), the peak
of the boom (dashed line) and the trough of the cycle (dash-doted line).22 It is apparent that during the
boom the cross-section of mandated investment moves toward regions where the probability of adjust-
ment is higher. The fraction of units with mandated investment close to zero decreases considerably
during the boom, while the fraction of micro units with mandated investment rates above 40% increases
signiﬁcantly. Also note that the fraction of units in the region where mandated investment is negative
decreases during the boom, since the sequence of positive shocks moves units away from this region.
and Spulber (1987).
22See Section 2 for the formal deﬁnition of mandated investment. Also note that the scale on the left of the ﬁgure is for the
mandated investment densities, while the scale on the right is for the adjustment hazards.
17The convex curves in Figure 3 depict the adjustment hazard, that is, the probability of adjusting con-
ditional on the corresponding value of mandated investment. It is clear that the probability of adjusting
increases with the (absolute) value of mandated investment. This is the ‘increasing hazard property’ de-
scribed in Caballero and Engel (1993a). We also note that as the boom proceeds, the adjustment hazard
shifts upward, so that aggregate investment becomes more responsive to positive and negative shocks
(seeFigure2)notonlybecauseunitsconcentrateinaregionwheretheyadjustbymore, butalsobecause
the probability of adjusting in this region is higher.
In summary, the decline in the strength of PE-smoothing during the boom (and hence the larger
response to shocks) results mainly from the rise in the share of agents that adjust to further shocks. This
is in contrast with the frictionless (and Calvo style models) where the only margin of adjustment is the
average size of these adjustments. This is shown in Figure 4, which decomposes the responsiveness
index into two components: one that reﬂects the response of the fraction of adjusters and another that
captures the response of average adjustments of those who adjust. Of course, both series add up to the
overall responsiveness index in Figure 2. It is apparent that most of the smoothing—approximately 70%
in this metric—is done by variations in the fraction of adjusters.
Figure 4: Decomposition of Responsiveness Index: Intensive and Extensive Margins
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18Theimportanceofﬂuctuationsinthefractionofadjustersisevenmorepronouncedifwedecompose
the path of the aggregate investment rate into the contributions from the ﬂuctuation of the fraction of
adjusters and the ﬂuctuation of the average size of adjustments, as shown in Figure 5. Both series are
in log-deviations from their steady state values. This is consistent with what Doms and Dunne (1998)
documented for establishment level investment in the US, where the fraction of units undergoing major
investment episodes accounts for a much higher share of aggregate (manufacturing) investment than
the average size of their investment.
Figure 6: Aggregate Capital











Let us now turn to the bust phase. Figure 6 illustrates the “overaccumulation” of capital resulting
from the large investment boom in the lumpy economy. As a result of this boom, once the positive
shocks subside, the economy experiences an “overhang” that leads to the protracted investment slump
shown in Figure 1.
Returning to Figure 3, we see the large capital accumulation during the boom leaves an unusually
large fraction of units in the region close to zero mandated investment, where units are very unlikely to
respondtoa shock, duetothelow valuesofthe adjustmenthazardinthisregion. Thisexplainsthe sharp
drop in the responsiveness index shown in Figure 7.
The observation of the slump in the responsiveness index has important implications for the econ-
omy’s ability to return to its steady state investment rate, as the latter becomes unresponsive to positive
stimuli,suchasapositiveaggregateshockorpolicyintervention(e.g.,aninvestmenttaxcredit). Figure7,
illustrates this mechanism by plotting the impulse responses of the frictionless and lumpy economies
followingapositiveaggregateshockthattakesplaceinperiod14,whenthegapbetweenindexofrespon-
siveness of the frictionless and lumpy economy is maximal.23 The more sluggish response of investment
23These impulse responses are plotted in deviation from the paths without the new shock, and—like the responsiveness
index—normalized by the standard deviation of the aggregate shock and c ≡ 1/(1−α−θ). See footnote 19 and Appendix F for
the rationale underlying the latter normalization constant.
19Figure 7: Impulse Responses at the Trough











IRF in a Bust
in the lumpy economy is apparent.
Figure 8: Boom-bust episode and maintenance: Investment rate














Let us conclude this section by returning to the role of the maintenance parameter. Figure 8 illus-
trates the boom-bust cycle for different values of this parameter. It is apparent that the size of the boom-
bust cycle increases with the importance of maintenance. The reason, again, is linked to the mechanism
discussed above. When maintenance investment is large, the drift of the processes for microeconomic
mandated investment (deﬁned as the investment rate if the unit draws a zero adjustment cost) is small,
since maintenanceinvestmentoffsetsdepreciationandtrendgrowth. Thisis importantinthesemodels,
as it implies that the cross section distributions of such investment are far from the Caplin-Spulber limit,
and hence there is plenty of space for them to vary in response to shocks. As before, this variation trans-
20lates into countercyclical ﬂuctuations in the degree of PE-smoothing, which exacerbates the magnitude
of an aggregate investment boom in the face of an unusually long string of positive aggregate shocks.
5 Indirect Effects: Improved Conventional RBC Moment-Matching
WhilethefrictionlessRBCmodelﬁtsthevolatilityofinvestmentwell,itfallsshortintermsofthevolatility
of consumption, output and employment (King and Rebelo, 1999). Since in our model microeconomic
frictions smooth aggregate investment, they simultaneously improve the ﬁt of the relative volatility of
investment to that of other aggregates and create space to raise the volatility of investment through a
reduction in GE-smoothing mechanisms. However, the latter reduction also raises the volatility of con-
sumptionandemployment. Whilewedidnotuseinformationonconsumptionandemploymentvolatil-
ity in our calibration, the tables below show that an indirect beneﬁt of our procedure is a signiﬁcant
improvement in the ﬁt of the model along these dimensions as well.
We also use this section to show that our results on aggregate investment dynamics survive main-
taining the degree of GE-smoothing at conventional levels (EIS around one).
5.1 Volatility and Persistence
Table 6: VOLATILITY OF AGGREGATES
St.dev. St.dev. rel. to σ(Y )
Y C I N C I N
Data: 2.00 1.73 5.94 2.00 0.86 2.97 1.00
Frictionless: 1.40 0.65 6.61 0.85 0.47 4.71 0.61
King-Rebelo: 1.39 0.61 4.09 0.67 0.44 2.95 0.48
This paper: 2.15 1.60 5.85 2.01 0.75 2.73 0.94
Table6reportstheobservedvolatilityofU.S.aggregates, andthoseimpliedbythefrictionlessmodel,
by the standard RBC model (from King and Rebelo (1999), which differs from frictionless in the curva-
tureparameteranditsquarterlyfrequency), andbyourmodel, bothinabsoluteterms(percentages)and
relative to the standard deviation of output. For our model we assume 50% maintenance yet the results
that follow are valid for all values of the parameter χ (for other values of χ, ranging from 0 to 100%, see
Appendix G).24 It is apparent from this table that our model is successful in ﬁtting the volatility of aggre-
gate consumption, investment, employment and capital, which we did not use in the calibration stage
(recall that we calibrated the volatility of sectoral and aggregate investment rates). In fact, the lumpy
model does substantially better than the frictionless and standard RBC models. Table 7 shows that our
24Since, by construction, our models match the volatility of the aggregate investment rate, we do not include this aggregate.
As usual, but with the exception for the aggregate investment rate, the series are log-HP-ﬁltered with a smoothness parameter
of 100. Also, for obvious reasons, our model’s counterpart of output isC +I.
21model also provides a better match for four of the ﬁve observed persistence (ﬁrst-order autocorrelation)
measures.25
Table 7: PERSISTENCE OF AGGREGATES
Y C I N I/K
Data: 0.53 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.71
Frictionless: 0.42 0.61 0.36 0.35 0.57
This paper: 0.47 0.52 0.43 0.47 0.69
Figure 9 exhibits the impulse response function for consumption, employment, and the investment
rate, for the frictionless and our model (χ=0.50).26 They corroborate the ﬁndings reported in the previ-
oustables. Itisapparentthattherearesigniﬁcantdifferencesbetweenthelumpymodelandthefriction-
less model for consumption and employment. Even for small shocks and an economy that starts off at
its steady state (this is what the impulse response function reports), there are clear differences in the dy-
namic response of aggregate quantities. More importantly, these differences constitute an improvement
over the frictionless model in terms of the ﬁt of US aggregate data. The differences for the investment
rate are smaller, which is not surprising since we imposed that both models have the same volatility. Yet
even in this case, the fact that our model exhibits higher persistence than the RBC model, brings it closer
to the data (see the last column in Table 7).
Given the success of the lumpy-high EIS model, we went further and tested formally whether it is
rejected. Column (1) in Table 8 considers the variance and autocovariances of C, I, N and Y when
calculating the standard chi-square-statistic (see Ingram and Lee, 1991).27 Since the resulting weighting
matrix is very close to singular, we exclude both moments involving Y in column (2).28 It is clear that our
model also outperforms the frictionless model using this formal approach. Furthermore, if we avoid a
poorly conditioned weighting matrix by excluding one of the moments, our model is not rejected by the




This paper: 30.5 1.9
Critical value: 11.1 7.8
25For χ=0.75 the ﬁt is better for all persistence measures, see Appendix G.
26The impulse responses are the log-deviations from the steady-state to a one-standard deviation innovation inthe aggregate
productivity shock.
27Thechi-squarestatisticsweobtainvarylittlewithwhetherweconsiderthestandardortheautocorrelationrobustweighting
matrix. The results we report are for the latter.
28Recall that: Y =C +I. The conditioning number for the weighting matrix falls by a factor of 20.
22Figure 9: Impulse response ofC, N and I/K
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235.2 On general equilibrium smoothing
The main reason for the gain in matching conventional RBC moments for consumption, employment
and output, is that microeconomic lumpiness generates substantial smoothing of aggregate investment,
thereby reducing the burden on general equilibrium smoothing to match investment volatility. Once the
relative importance of general equilibrium smoothing is reduced, aggregate consumption and employ-
ment can react more aggressively to aggregate shocks.
The only parameter to control the strength of general equilibrium forces in our model is the EIS,
which needs to be raised substantially to match aggregate moments. If interpreted literally as a microe-
conomic preferences parameter, our numbers for the EIS are much higher than the standard estimates
found in the literature. The most recent analysis of this matter is Gruber (2005), who uses a careful iden-
tiﬁcation strategy based on households responses to tax movements. He ﬁnds an EIS of two, which is on
the high end of previous estimates.29 Table 9 below reports the moments from our lumpy adjustment
model, both when we impose the conventional EIS value of one (which is used mainly for analytical
convenience) and when we use Gruber’s estimate.
Table 9: RELATIVE VOLATILITY AND PERSISTENCE OF AGGREGATES
St.dev. rel. to σ(Y ) Persistence
C I N Y C I N I/K
Data: 0.86 2.97 1.00 0.53 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.71
Frictionless: 0.47 4.71 0.61 0.42 0.61 0.36 0.35 0.57
This paper: 0.75 2.73 0.94 0.47 0.52 0.43 0.47 0.69
EIS = 1: 0.60 3.54 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.42 0.42 0.69
EIS = 2: 0.69 3.03 0.68 0.45 0.49 0.42 0.44 0.69
Frictionless with high EIS: 0.72 5.72 0.95 0.53 0.80 0.28 0.50 0.44
The volatility results are reported normalized by the standard deviation of output, since the overall
volatility of quantities is too low now that we add more sizeable GE-smoothing to PE-smoothing.30,31
It is apparent from this table that the lumpy model with more conventional EIS values still does sub-
stantially better than the frictionless model in terms of relative volatility and persistence. When the EIS
is set to one, the lumpy model does better in six out of the eight statistics reported in the table, and when
the EIS is raised to two (as in Gruber), it does better for seven out of eight statistics.
Conversely, the last row of the table shows that if one runs the frictionless model with our estimate
of the EIS for the χ = 0.5 case, which is around 9, the volatility of investment rises too much and its
29Also, see Hansen and Singleton (1996), who ﬁnd a slightly higher value for the EIS.
30Alternatively, we could recalibrate σA so as to match the aggregate investment rate. The moments reported in the table
do not vary if we take this approach—nor do the persistence measures—and overall volatility is in the right ballpark now. The
values of σA obtained this way are 0.0133 for EIS=1 and 0.0122 for EIS=2.
31The standard deviation of aggregate investment rates declines from 0.0074 to 0.0053 and 0.0058, respectively, in the models
with EIS=1 and EIS=2. The upper bound on the fraction of overall smoothing accounted for by the partial equilibrium are 74%
and 78%, respectively, while the lower bounds are 16 and 20%. These numbers are in the same ballpark as those reported in
Table 2. The resulting percentage standard deviations of output are 1.18% and 1.52%.
24persistence drops too much relative to US data.32
Finally,anoteontherobustnessofourmainresults. Figure10reportsthepathoftheindexofrespon-
siveness for the same experiment as in the previous section for conventional levels of the EIS (and the
frictionless model).33 Again, it is apparent that the source of nonlinearities reported in the previous sec-
tion survives the increase in GE-smoothing brought about by the reduction in the EIS. This conclusion
is conﬁrmed by Figure 11 which shows that, for values of the EIS equal to 1 and 2, the path of the aggre-
gate investment rate in the model with lumpy investment differs substantially from the corresponding
trajectory for the model where GE forces are the only source of smoothing. As before, the boom is more
pronounced and the overhang period more protracted.
Figure 10: Responsiveness Index and Boom-bust Episode: Robustness














c = .50, EIS=1
c = .50, EIS=2
32Were-calibratethestandarddeviationofaggregatetechnology, sothatthestandarddeviationofaggregateinvestmentrates
is exactly matched. This results in σA =0.0048, and a percentage standard deviation for output of 1.25%.
33Since now the models overall display less volatility compared to the frictionless model, we depict log-deviations of the
sensitivity index from the steady state.
25Figure 11: Aggregate Investment Rate and Boom-bust Episode: Robustness














c = .50, EIS=1
c = 0.50, EIS=2
6 Final Remarks
We have shown that adding realistic lumpy capital adjustment at the microeconomic level to an oth-
erwise standard RBC model has important macroeconomic implications. In particular, the impulse re-
sponse functions of aggregate investment become history dependent. Relative to the standard DSGE
model, booms feed into themselves and can lead to signiﬁcantly larger capital accumulation following a
string of positive shocks. Busts, on the other hand, can lead to protracted periods of depressed invest-
ment, which are largely unresponsive to policy stimuli.
That is, the differences introduced by the lumpy model are most signiﬁcant at the times that matter
the most: during pronounced booms and recessions. Furthermore, the smoothing of aggregate invest-
ment stemming from the microeconomic frictions reduces the burden of smoothing that is typically
borne by general equilibrium forces. This shift in the smoothing mechanism has the important side
effect of signiﬁcantly improving the ﬁt of consumption and employment volatility as well.
Roughly, we calibrated the strength of the partial equilibrium smoothing mechanism by ﬁtting sec-
toral data and used the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to control the additional smoothing that
takes place from sectoral to aggregate data. It is apparent that in this logic, or in that of the standard RBC
model, the EIS as is not a structural parameter but a reduced form way of capturing more complex labor
and capital market speciﬁcations. Thus, the substantial gains obtained from increasing the EIS point
in the direction of ﬁnding ﬂatter labor and capital supplies than implied by the standard model. On
the capital supply side, there are many good reasons why even with a true EIS around one, the effective
capital supply is substantially ﬂatter. Most prominently, the US economy is open and receives massive
capitalﬂows. Also, capitalcanbereallocatedacrosssectorswhicharenotperfectly synchronizedintheir
cyclical responses. On the labor supply side, there is a large number of theories and evidence of ﬂat
quasi-labor supplies. These are old themes, which our model and ﬁndings only help making a stronger
26case for.
Either way, whether one interprets the EIS parameter structurally or not, or whether one is married
toanEISofoneornot,thispapershasshownthatcontrarytopreviousclaims,thelumpymodelenriches
the dynamic responses of DSGE models in important dimensions.
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29A Parameter Appendix
The following table summarizes the common parameters of all the model speciﬁcations explored in the
paper:
ρA σA ρ σS σI δ γ β θ ν
0.8254 0.00953 0.53 0.0583 0.0812 0.0690 1.0160 0.9770 0.1800 0.6400
TheparametersρA,δ,γ,ρ,νandβaretakenfromKahnandThomas(2005). Theyarestandardvalues.
The calibration of the other parameters is explained in Section 3.
B Data Appendix
B.1 Aggregate Data
We use yearly U.S. data on consumption, investment, employment and capital, from 1960-1996. Since
our model is a closed economy without government, we look at C +I rather than GDP data. The stan-
dardmoments,however,donotdiffermuch. Thedataoninvestmentandcapitalincludeequipmentand
structures. They stem from the BEA: Stock of net nonresidential ﬁxed assets and real cost investment.34
These series are in 1996 chained dollars. Consumption data are from the yearly “Personal real consump-
tion expenditures - billions of chained 2000”-series (PCECCA), from St. Louis FED. Employment data are
from the “Total private employment”-series (CES0500000001), from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They
exclude farm employment, and are based on payroll data. The key statistics for aggregate investment
rates are a standard deviation of 0.0074 and a persistence of 0.71
Throughout the paper, for both real data and simulated data, we take the raw series for investment




For lack of good industry data outside of manufacturing, the data source here is the NBER manufac-
turing data set, publicly available on the NBER website. It contains yearly 4-digit industry data for the
manufacturing sector, according to the SIC-87 classiﬁcation. We look at the years 1960-1996, later years
are not available. We take out industry 3292, the asbestos products, because this sector essentially dies
out in the nineties. This leaves us with 458 industries altogether.
Since the sectoral model analysis has to satisfy two requirements: 1) isolation from general equilib-
rium effects, 2) contain a large number of production units, we think that the 3-digit level is the best
34(http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/faweb/details/).
30compromise aggregation level. This leaves us with 140 industries. Hence, we sum employment levels,
real capital, nominal investment and nominal value added onto the 3-digit level. The deﬂators for in-
vestment and shipments are a weighted sum (weighted by investment and value added, respectively).
This allows us to compute series of real investment and real value added. Since the data base does not
contain separate deﬂators for value added (as opposed to shipments), we use the one for shipments to
compute a real value added series. Moreover, since the data base does not contain implicit deﬂators for
capital, we just sum real capital. The deﬂators on the 4-digit level are generally identical or very close to
each other, so that this is a justiﬁable procedure.
TFP-Calculation: Since our model is essentially about value added production as opposed to output
production—we do not model utilization of materials and energy—we do not use the TFP-series in the
data set, which are based on a production function for output. Rather, we use a production function
for real value added in employment and real capital with payroll as a fraction of value added as the
employment share, and the residual as capital share, and perform a standard Solow residual calculation
for each industry separately.
Next, in order to extract the residual industry-speciﬁc and uncorrelated-with-the-aggregate compo-
nent for each industry, we regress each industry time series of logged Solow residuals on the time series
of the cross-sectional average of logged Solow residuals and a constant. The residuals of this regression
are then taken as the pure sectoral Solow residual series, by construction, they are uncorrelated with the
cross-sectional average series. We then compute an AR(1)-speciﬁcation for each of these series. Finally,
the value-added-weighted average of these coefﬁcients is then taken to be ρS =0.70 and σS =0.0583.
Sincethiscomputationissubjecttosubstantialmeasurementerrorandsomewhatarbitrary choices,
we perform a number of robustness checks: 1) We ﬁx the employment share and capital share to ν=0.64
and θ = 0.18, as in our model parametrization for all industries. 2) We study a production function that
distinguishes between production workers and non-production workers. 3) We look at raw industry-
speciﬁcSolowresidualseries,andaseries,wherewesimplysubtractthetimeseriesofthecross-sectional
average. 4) We look at non-weighted averages to get the ﬁnal AR(1) coefﬁcients. 5) We look at medians
instead of averages. The results for σS are fairly robust. Finally, to check how much the results are inﬂu-
enced by using 3-digit data, the corresponding values for the 4-digit data are: ρS =0.69 and σS =0.0762.
Calculation of I/K-Moments: To extract a pure sectoral component of the time series of the industry
investment rate, we perform the same regression that was used for TFP-calculation. We do not log or
ﬁlter the investment rate series. The common component is now a capital-weighted average of the in-
dustryinvestmentrates. Again,weperformrobustnesschecks3)-5)fromabove,withfairlystableresults.




31For calibration, we use the 3-digit level standard deviation. Similar results would obtain if we use
the 4-digit standard deviation instead, since the standard deviation of sectoral investment rates in the
frictionless model are one order of magnitude higher than the numbers above (see footnote 16).
C Numerical Appendix
In this appendix, we describe in detail the numerical implementation of the model computation. All
codes were computed in Matlab 6.5R13.
C.1 Decision Problem
Given the assumptions we made in the main paper: 1) ρS = ρI = ρ, and 2) approximating the distribu-
tion µ by the aggregate capital stock, ¯ k, the dynamic programming problem has a 4-dimensional state
space: (k, ¯ k,z,²). Since the employment problem has an analytical solution, there is essentially just one
continuous control, k0. We discretize the state space in the following ways:
1. k: nk =30 grid points from [0,5], with a lower grid width at low capital levels, where the curvature
of the value function is highest. In general, the value function is fairly linear.
2. ¯ k : n¯ k =11 grid points in [0.60,1.10], equi-spaced.
3. z :nz =10gridpointsin[0.93,1.075]withclosergridpointsaroundunity. FortheGauss-Hermitian
integration (see Judd, 1998) we use 7 integration nodes.




the unconditional variance of the combined technology process. For the transition matrix we use
the procedure proposed in Tauchen (1986). The large state space here slows down computation
considerably, but we need it for a meaningful sectoral simulation.
We check the robustness of our computations by varying the number of grid points and Gauss-
Hermitian integration nodes.
We note that for all partial equilibrium computations the dimension of the state space collapses to
three, ¯ k is no longer needed to compute prices and aggregate movements. Instead, we follow Kahn and
Thomas(2005)inﬁxingtheintertemporalpriceandtherealwageattheiraveragelevelsfromthegeneral
equilibrium simulations.
Since we allow for a continuous control, k, and ¯ k and z can take on any value continuously, we
can only compute the value function exactly at the grid points above and interpolate for in-between
values. This is done by using a multidimensional cubic splines procedure, with a so-called “not-a-knot”-
condition to address the large number of degrees of freedom problem, when using splines (see Judd,
1998). We compute the solution by value function iteration, using 20 steps of policy improvement after
each actual optimization procedure. The optimum is found by using a golden section search, which is
fast and robust. Due to the nature of the non-convexity, the optimal return level does not depend on k,
32which reduces the number of optimization problems to be solved at each iteration to n¯ k ×nz ×n². Upon
convergence, we check single-peakedness of the objective function, to guarantee that the golden section
search is reasonable.
C.2 Equilibrium Simulation
For the calibration of the general equilibrium models we draw one random series for the aggregate tech-
nology level and ﬁx it across models. For calibration purposes we use T = 600 and discard the ﬁrst 100
observations. The statistics we report are then based on a series of T = 2600, with the ﬁrst 600 identical
to those in the calibration process. We ﬁnd that, generally, the statistics are robust to T. We start from
anarbitraryindividualcapitaldistributionandthestationarydistributionforthecombinedproductivity
level. The model economies typically settle fast into their stochastic steady state. Since with idiosyn-
cratic shocks, adjustment costs and necessary maintenance some production unit may not adjust for a
very long time, we take out any individual capital stock in the distribution that has a marginal weight
below 10−10, in order to save on memory. We re-scale the remaining distribution proportionally.
As in the production unit’s decision problem, we use a golden section search to ﬁnd the optimal
target capital level, given p. We ﬁnd the market clearing intertemporal price, using the Matlab built-
in function fzero, which uses a combination of bisection, secant and inverse quadratic interpolation
methods. Precision of the market-clearing outcome is generally below 10−5 for the frictionless models,
and below 10−7 for the lumpy models (these numbers are maxima, not averages).
To further assess the quality of the assumed log-linear equilibrium rules, we perform the following
simulation: for each point in the T = 2600 time series, we iterate for a time series of ˜ T = 100 aggregate
capital and the intertemporal price forward, using only the equilibrium rules. We then compare the ag-
gregate capital and p after ˜ T steps with the actually simulated ones, when the equilibrium price was
updated at each step. We then compute maximum absolute percentage deviations, mean squared per-
centage deviations, and the correlation between the simulated values and the out-of-sample forecasts.
The following two tables summarize the numerical results for each model. The rows contain: the co-
efﬁcients of the log-linear regression, its R2 and standard error, the R2 of a regression that includes the
log of the standard deviation of the capital distribution to assess the room for improvement by using
higher moments,35 the F-value for equality of coefﬁcients in the equilibrium loop, and the three above
measures that assess the out-of-sample quality of the equilibrium rules. First for aggregate capital:
35Note that the standard deviation was not actually used in the equilibrium calculation.
33FL 0-maint. 0.25-maint. 0.5-maint. 1.00-maint.
a¯ k -0.0534 -0.0631 -0.0563 -0.0514 -0.0622
b¯ k 0.7361 0.7967 0.7971 0.7991 0.7546
c¯ k 0.6143 0.5795 0.5820 0.5796 0.5908
R2 1.0000 0.9991 0.9988 0.9987 0.9981
SE 0.0001 0.0010 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013
R2
std 1.0000 0.9999 0.9998 0.9997 0.9983
F 7.5e−5 1.05e−10 0 0 0
MAD(%) 0.11 0.87 0.99 1.04 1.25
MSE(%) 0.02 0.35 0.40 0.42 0.31
Correl. 0.9999 0.9954 0.9942 0.9937 0.9955
Then for p:
FL 0-maint. 0.25-maint. 0.5-maint. 1.00-maint.
ap 0.7947 0.1056 0.0948 0.0801 0.0215
bp -0.3044 -0.0918 -0.0841 -0.0728 -0.0263
cp -0.6622 -0.2299 -0.2133 -0.1884 -0.0610
R2 1.000 0.9967 0.9971 0.9978 0.9983
SE 0.0000 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000
R2
std 1.0000 0.9997 0.9997 0.9997 0.9987
F 0.0002 5.5e−12 0 0 1.1e−11
MAD(%) 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.05
MSE(%) 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Correl. 0.9999 0.9991 0.9990 0.9990 0.9989
Figure 12: Assessing the approximate forecasting rules








Fit of the Equilibrium Rule for Aggregate K: 0.50−Maint.
Series
Fitted Series
It can be seen from Figure 12 and the table above that the equilibrium rules generally perform very
well. Inclusion of the second moment of the capital distribution may yield a mild improvement of the
34approximation quality, but it is doubtful, whether aggregate statistics can be changed in any signiﬁcant
way. As can be expected, in models I-V, with low σC, the inﬂuence of aggregate variables on prices dras-
tically decreases, these scenarios are close to partial equilibrium.
C.3 Sectoral Simulation
Underlying the sectoral simulation are four assumptions: ﬁrst, a large enough number of sectors and,
secondly, that σS is large enough relative to σA, so that we can compute the sectoral implications of
our model independently of the aggregate general equilibrium calculations. This is also reﬂected in our
treatment of the sectoral data as residual values, which are uncorrelated with aggregate components.
Thirdly, we make use of the assumption that a sector is large enough to comprise a large number of
production units by invoking a law of large numbers now for the true idiosyncratic productivity. Finally,
ρS =ρI,andtheindependenceofsectoralandtheidiosyncraticproductivity,sothatwecantreatsectoral
and truly idiosyncratic uncertainty as one state variable in the general equilibrium problem.
We start by ﬁxing the aggregate technology level at its average level: zSS = 1. The converged equilib-
rium law of motion for aggregate capital can then be used to compute the steady state aggregate capital






This, in turn, leads to the steady state pSS ≡exp(ap +bp log(¯ kSS)).
Then we specify a separate grid for idiosyncratic and sectoral productivity in such a way that all new
grid points and any product of them will lie on the original 19-state grid for the combined productivity,
used in the general equilibrium problem. Recall that this was speciﬁed for (ρ = 0.53,σ = 0.1). Given
the equi-spaced (in logs) nature of the combined grid this is obviously possible. Thus, the idiosyncratic
grid comprises 11 grid points, and the sectoral grid 9 grid points, both equi-spaced and centered around
unity. This naturally reﬂects σI > σS. The implied grid width for the idiosyncratic grid is 2.0514 times
the unconditional standard deviation, and 2.2870 times the unconditional standard deviation for the
sectoral grid. Both values are well within commonly used ranges. We then use Tauchen’s method to
compute transition matrices for the Markov chain, given by the sectoral and the truly idiosyncratic grid.




We then recompute optimal target capital levels as well as gross values of investment at zSS, ¯ kSS,
once and for all at the 19 values for ². By construction, these are then also the values for any (²S,²I)-
combination. Note that we use the value functions computed from the general equilibrium case. We
draw a random series of T = 2600 for ²S, which remains ﬁxed across all models, start from an arbitrary
capital distribution and the stationary distribution for the idiosyncratic technology level, and follow the
behavior of this representative sector, using the sectoral policy rules. The details are similar to the one
used in the equilibrium simulation.
We ﬁnally test our ﬁrst two assumptions in the sectoral computation: a continuum of sectors, so that
sectoral shocks do not have aggregate consequences; and that the fact that σS À σA allows us to ﬁx the
35aggregate environment to its steady state level, when computing sectoral data and working with sectoral
data that have been puriﬁed of their aggregate components.
To this end, we compute the equilibrium with a ﬁnite number of sectors. Also, the sectoral data
are computed subjecting it to the moving aggregate environment, now explicitly allowing for full GE-
smoothing. Thisrequiresintroducinganotheraggregatestatevariable,givenby: ¯ ²S,t ≡
P
i=1,...,NS log(²S,t(i)),
where NS is the ﬁnite number of sectors. Obviously, ¯ ²S,t =0,∀ t, as NS →∞, by the law of large numbers
and assuming sectoral independence.
We ﬁx a set of NS independent draws of ²S of length T = 600. We then ﬁt an AR(1)-process to the
resulting ¯ ²S,t-process. Not surprisingly, ρ¯ ²S ≈ ρI = ρS. We ﬁx it at the latter value. This additional aggre-
gate state is then integrated over by Gauss-Hermitian integration, which is facilitated by the fact that the
¯ ²S,t-process is independent of the aggregate technology process (by assumption).
We choose two different values for NS. First, 400, which roughly equals the number of 3-digit SIC-
87 sectors in the U.S. (395). Since, however, sectors are of very different size and overall importance,
and also often correlated, we decrease, secondly, NS to 100 for robustness reasons. The resulting σ¯ ²S are
0.0030 and 0.0060, respectively. Notice that in both cases σ¯ ²S is considerably smaller than σA, so that we
should not expect too large an effect from this additional aggregate uncertainty.
In order to make the computation viable, we have to scale down the numerical speciﬁcation of the
computation,inparticularthegridlengths: nk =20,n¯ k =7,andnz =7. Thegridlengthfortheadditional
aggregate shock is also 7, equi-spaced, between [−0.03,0.03] for NS = 100, and [−0.015,0.015] for NS =
400. We use 3 nodes for both continuous aggregate shocks in the Gauss Hermitian integration. We also
check that these numerical changes as such do not affect the results too much in the original simpliﬁed
computations.
The following table shows the aggregate and sectoral standard deviations for investment rates for the
frictionless model and the model for χ = 0.5. The sectoral standard deviations are shown as a weighted
average (the unweighted averages are only insigniﬁcantly different) both for the raw sectoral investment
rates and the residual sectoral investment rates (see section B.2).
Frictions: GE GE GE and micro GE and micro
Number of sectors: 100 400 100 400
Aggr. St.dev. 0.0095 0.0079 0.0078 0.0075
Sect. St.dev. - raw 0.2037 0.2050 0.0196 0.0196
Sect. St.dev. - res. 0.2033 0.2047 0.0180 0.0180
The ﬁrst important observation is that the numbers obtained here are not much different from what
wehaveobtainedinthesimpliﬁedcomputation,whichisinparticulartruefortheχ=0.5-model. Specif-
ically, the frictionless model continues to fail to match observed sectoral volatility by an order of mag-
nitude. Secondly, the numbers deviate in the expected direction: the aggregate standard deviation in-
creases, because there is an additional aggregate shock, but only slightly so; the sectoral standard devia-
tions decrease a little bit, because now general equilibrium forces contribute also to sectoral smoothing.
36And, most importantly, the numbers show that the results obtained in the main part of the paper are
biased in favor of the frictionless model, in particular if we look at the NS =100 case. Following our orig-
inal calibration, in this case σA would have to be decreased below its current value to match observed
aggregate volatility of investment rates, but then in the χ = 0.5-model, the calibrated σC would have to
be even lower, thus placing an even lower weight on general equilibrium forces.
D Matching Establishment Statistics
One argument we used in the main text to justify the use of sectoral rather than plant level data to cal-
ibrate micro frictions was that in nonlinear models small changes at the micro level can lead to large
differences after aggregating across micro units, before general equilibrium forces set in, and hence it
is better to calibrate at a more robust level of aggregation. We provided the Caplin and Spulber (1987)
model as an example of the complex mapping from micro frictions to aggregate smoothing due to them.
The other, closely related, argument we used is that there are many determinants of plant level mo-
ments which are irrelevant for the macro dimensions we are concerned with, and hence do not seem
to be fruitful moments to base a macro model on. In this appendix we provide support to this claim by
showing in a model that matches sectoral and aggregate moments, that minor modiﬁcations of the mi-
cro underpinnings of the model can lead to a satisfactory match of establishment level moments as well.
Furthermore, in the simple extension we propose, the initial match of sectoral and aggregate moments
is unaffected by the extension.
D.1 A Simple Extension
A ﬁrst choice we need to make when matching the model to micro data is to decide how many micro
units in the model correspond to one establishment. Choices by other authors have covered a wide
range, going from one to a number large enough—sometimes a continuum—so that adding additional
units makes no difference.36
Two additional issues arise ifwechoosetomodel anestablishmentasthe aggregationofmany micro
units. First, we must address the extent to which shocks—both productivity and adjustment costs—
are correlated across units within an establishment.37 Second, we must take a stance on the fact that
establishments sell off and buy what in our model corresponds to one or more micro units.
Next we present a simple model that incorporates the issues mentioned above. The economy is
composed of sectors (indexed by s), which are composed of establishments (indexed by e), which are
composed of units (indexed by u). The log-productivity shock faced by unit u in establishment e in







(2005) of the latter.






Consistent with the assumptions we made in the paper, we assume ρS = ρE = ρU and denote the com-
mon value by ρ.
An establishment is composed of a large number (continuum) of units. The extent to which the be-
havior of units within an establishment is correlated will depend on the relative importance of σU and
σE. The larger σE, the larger the correlation of productivity shocks across units within an establish-
ment and the more coordinated their investment decisions will be. For simplicity we assume that the
adjustment costs drawn by units belonging to an establishment are independent, so that even if units’
productivity shocks are perfectly correlated, there is some heterogeneity in units’ behavior.
The sectoral and aggregate investment series generated by this model will be the same as those gen-
erated by the model we developed in the main text as long as σ2
E +σ2
U = σ2
I, since all we are doing in
this extension is grouping micro units into groups we call “establishments” which has no implication for
sectoral aggregates.40 We therefore can decompose σ2
I into the sum of σ2
U and σ2
E as we please, with-





I. Productivity shocks are the same across units within a establishment when ζ = 0, their
correlation decreases as ζ increases.
Regarding the sale and purchase of micro units, we assume that in every period an establishment
with capital Kest suffers a sales/purchase shock τest, so that its capital becomes (1+τest)Kest. The τ’s
are i.i.d. draws from a zero mean normal distribution with standard deviation στ. Since the sectors
in our model are composed of a continuum of establishments, our choice of a distribution with zero
mean for purchase/sales shocks ensures that sectoral and aggregate statistics are unaffected by this ex-
tension as well. We choose a normal distribution because it incorporates only one additional parameter
(parsimony) and it is symmetric (thus any asymmetries in the histogram of investment rates cannot be
attributed to this choice).
We denote by ˜ iest the investment rate for a given establishment according to our model, and by iest
the corresponding investment rate recorded by the LRD. The latter differs from the former in that it in-
cludes the sale/purchase of units from other establishments, which is ignored in our original model. We
then have:
iest =(1−τest)˜ iest −τest(1−δ). (19)
Summing up, our (admittedly simple) extension introduces two parameters over which we can opti-
mize to ﬁt establishment level moments without affecting the match of sectoral and aggregate statistics.
These parameters are the degree to which productivity shocks are correlated across units within an es-
38xt ∼ AR(1;ρ,σ) means that the process xt follows an AR(1) with ﬁrst order autocorrelation ρ and standard deviation of
innovations equal to σ.
39Sectoral innovations are independent across sectors and independent from the innovations of the aggregate shock. Es-
tablishment level innovations are independent across establishments and independent from the innovations of the aggregate
and sectoral shocks. Finally, unit level innovations are independent across units and independent from the innovations of the
aggregate, sectoral and establishment-level shocks.
40The assumption that investment decisions are made at the unit level—and not at the establishment level—is important
here. Remember that our objective here is not to add realism to our original model, it is to show that matching micro moments
isn’t a robust way of pinning down microeconomic parameters.
38tablishment, and the average magnitude of sales and purchases of micro units across establishments.
D.2 Matching Establishment Level Statistics
We work with χ = 0.50. For a ﬁxed value of ζ, we generate a histogram with 2,500 realizations of estab-
lishment level I/K using our model.41
Denote by fi, i = 1,...,5 the fraction of LRD establishments that adjusted less than −20%, between
−20 and −1%, between −1% and 1%, between 1 and 20% and above 20%, respectively. And denote by
πi(στ) the fraction of units with adjustment in the previous bins after applying the transformation de-
scribed in (19). We choose the value of στ that minimizes
P
i |fi −πi(στ)|/fi, that is, we minimize the
absolute relative error.
Table 10 presents our results. We present the estimated values for the ﬁve statistics considered in the
extension Khan and Thomas (2005) introduce to obtain a better match of LRD moments. As can be seen,
our model does a reasonable job matching the micro statistics which have been considered earlier in the
literature. In fact, our ﬁt is similar to the one Khan and Thomas (2005) obtain when they extend their
model to ﬁt the micro statistics. Also, the statistics we obtain vary rather little with ζ, as long as ζ is larger
than zero (say, above 0.1). We report our estimates for ζ=1 and ζ=0.5 (the corresponding values for στ
are 0.134 and 0.133, respectively).
Table 10: MATCHING LRD MOMENTS
Model |I/K|<1% I/K >20% I/K <−20% I/K ≥1% I/K ≤−1%
Data 8.2 18.7 1.9 80.9 10.9
Khan-Thomas extension: 4.8 18.0 1.5 72.0 23.2
Our model extension (ζ=1): 4.8 20.1 1.9 70.7 24.5
Our model extension (ζ=0.5): 4.8 20.3 1.9 70.6 24.6
E Decomposing PE- vs. GE-smoothing
Thissectiondescribeshowwedecomposetherelativecontributionsofsmoothingby PE-andGE-forces.
We ﬁrst remove both smoothing from adjustment costs as well as GE-smoothing from the model,
by ﬁxing the intertemporal price and the real wage at their average values, the resulting model has no
sources of smoothing (NONE). Next, we introduce micro frictions and aggregate across units (PE), and
then also include GE-smoothing through market prices (BOTH). We also consider the case with general
equilibrium smoothing without micro frictions (GE).
The ﬁrst four columns in Table 11 report the standard deviation of aggregate investment rates for
all possible combinations of sources of smoothing. The last column reports upper and lower bounds,
41We compute these investment rates using the approximation described in Appendix C.3 with σ2
S +σ2




E in the role of σ2
I.
39UB,LB, on the relative importance of PE-smoothing in the various models, as measured by:
UB = log[σ(NONE)/σ(PE)]/log[σ(NONE)/σ(BOTH)],
LB = 1−log[σ(NONE)/σ(GE)]/log[σ(NONE)/σ(BOTH)]
In the case of our model, the importance of PE-smoothing increases with χ. This is consistent with our
discussion in Section 4, since the cross-section of mandated investment for χ=0 is closest to that in the
Caplin and Spulber (1987) setting with no smoothing via partial equilibrium aggregation. Yet even for
χ = 0 we have that the midpoint of the interval deﬁned by the lower and upper bound for the fraction
explained by micro smoothing is almost 60%.
Table 11: SMOOTHING DECOMPOSITION
Model Sources of smoothing PE/total smoothing
None PE GE PE + GE Lower bd. Upper bd.
Khan-Thomas-Lumpy (2005): 0.1050 0.0660 0.0080 0.0080 0.0% 18.0%
Our model (0 maint.): 0.0458 0.0096 0.0133 0.0074 32.2% 85.7%
Our model (25% maint.): 0.0458 0.0094 0.0138 0.0074 34.2% 86.9%
Our model (50% maint.): 0.0458 0.0091 0.0148 0.0074 38.0% 88.7%
Our model (75% maint.): 0.0458 0.0089 0.0159 0.0074 42.0% 89.9%
Our model (100% maint.): 0.0458 0.0083 0.0236 0.0074 63.6% 93.7%
It becomes apparent that in this metric the lumpy model put forth by Khan and Thomas (2005) is
very close to a frictionless model already in its PE set up, so that their irrelevance result for the aggregate
becomes somewhat less surprising.
F The Responsiveness Index
Givenaneconomycharacterizedbyµt andaggregateproductivitylevel zt wedenotetheresultingaggre-
gate investment rate by I





















where σA is the standard deviation of the aggregate innovation.







The factor (1−θ−ν) is included so that the index is approximately one when no sources of smoothing





Solving this problem leads to the following optimal capital target level as a function of aggregate tech-
nology:
k∗ =Cz1/(1−θ−ν),






thereby justifying the normalization constant.
G Robustness to Variations in the Maintenance Parameter
In this appendix we show that the results reported for our model in Section 5 vary little with the choice
of the maintenance parameter χ. Hence our conclusions are robust to having considered only the case
χ = 0.50 in that section. The tables below present the volatility measures, persistence measures, and
J-statistic for values of χ between 0 and 100%.
Table 12: VOLATILITY OF AGGREGATES AND χ
St.dev. St.dev. rel. to σ(Y )
Y C I N C I N
Data: 2.00 1.73 5.94 2.00 0.86 2.97 1.00
Frictionless: 1.40 0.65 6.61 0.85 0.47 4.71 0.61
King-Rebelo: 1.39 0.61 4.09 0.67 0.44 2.95 0.48
0% maint.: 2.06 1.51 5.91 1.91 0.73 2.87 0.93
25% maint.: 2.09 1.54 5.90 1.95 0.73 2.82 0.93
50% maint.: 2.15 1.60 5.85 2.01 0.75 2.73 0.94
75% maint.: 2.22 1.67 6.10 2.09 0.75 2.75 0.94
100%-maint.: 2.42 1.93 6.81 2.37 0.80 2.81 0.98
42For notational simplicity we leave out idiosyncratic and sectoral shocks.
41Table 13: PERSISTENCE OF AGGREGATES AND χ
Y C I N I/K
Data: 0.53 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.71
Frictionless: 0.42 0.61 0.36 0.35 0.57
0% maint.: 0.46 0.51 0.43 0.45 0.68
25% maint.: 0.46 0.51 0.43 0.46 0.69
50% maint.: 0.47 0.52 0.43 0.47 0.69
75% maint.: 0.48 0.56 0.40 0.47 0.65
100%-maint.: 0.50 0.62 0.36 0.50 0.56
Table 14: J-STATISTICS AND χ
(1) (2)
Frictionless: 53.3 44.7
0% maint.: 22.2 2.0
25% maint.: 25.6 1.8
50% maint.: 30.5 1.9
75% maint.: 28.9 1.3
100%-maint.: 28.2 9.7
Critical value: 11.1 7.8
42